Ibn Rushd (Arabic: bn rshd; full name Arabic: 'bw lwlyd mHmd bn Hmd bn rshd, translit. `Abu l-Walid Muhammad Ibn `Ahmad Ibn Rushd; 14 April 1126 - 10 December 1198), often Latinized as Averroes (), was a medieval Andalusian Moorish Arab polymath. He wrote on logic, Aristotelian and Islamic philosophy, Islamic theology, the Maliki school of Islamic jurisprudence, psychology, political theory, the theory of Andalusian classical music, geography, mathematics, as well as the medieval sciences of medicine, astronomy, physics, and celestial mechanics. Ibn Rushd was born in Cordoba, Al Andalus (present-day Spain), and died at Marrakesh in present-day Morocco.

Ibn Rushd looked to Aristotle as to whether the world was eternal. In his Physics, the Greek philosopher argues that everything that comes into existence does so from a substratum. Therefore, if the underlying matter of the universe came into existence, it would come into existence from a substratum. But the nature of matter is precisely to be the substratum from which other things arise. Consequently, the underlying matter of the universe could have come into evidence only from an already existing matter exactly like itself; to assume that the underlying matter of the universe came into existence would require assuming that an underlying matter already existed. As this assumption is self-contradictory, Aristotle argued, matter must be eternal. Because in his eyes, "Aristotle demonstrated the eternity of matter", Ibn Rushd "abandon[ed] belief in the creation out of nothing."  This is not to say that Ibn Rushd denied the Creation; rather, he proposed an eternal creation. Oliver Leaman explains Ibn Rushd's argument as such:  We [as humans] can decide to do something, we can wait for a certain time before acting, we can wonder about our future actions; but such possibilities cannot arise for [an eternal, omnipotent, omnipresent] God. In his case there is no gap between desire and action, nothing stands in the way of his activity; and yet we are told by al-Ghazali that God suddenly created the world. What differentiates one time from another for God? What could motivate him to create the world at one particular time as opposed to another? For us, different times are different because they have different qualitative aspects, yet before the creation of the world, when there was nothing around to characterize one time as distinct from another, there is nothing to characterize one time over another as the time for creation to take place.

Using a quote from the above article, answer the following question: Was there more to it?
We [as humans] can decide to do something, we can wait for a certain time before acting, we can wonder about our future actions;