input: In 1879, Peirce was appointed Lecturer in logic at Johns Hopkins University, which had strong departments in a number of areas that interested him, such as philosophy (Royce and Dewey completed their PhDs at Hopkins), psychology (taught by G. Stanley Hall and studied by Joseph Jastrow, who coauthored a landmark empirical study with Peirce), and mathematics (taught by J. J. Sylvester, who came to admire Peirce's work on mathematics and logic). His Studies in Logic by Members of the Johns Hopkins University (1883) contained works by himself and Allan Marquand, Christine Ladd, Benjamin Ives Gilman, and Oscar Howard Mitchell, several of whom were his graduate students. Peirce's nontenured position at Hopkins was the only academic appointment he ever held.  Brent documents something Peirce never suspected, namely that his efforts to obtain academic employment, grants, and scientific respectability were repeatedly frustrated by the covert opposition of a major Canadian-American scientist of the day, Simon Newcomb. Peirce's efforts may also have been hampered by what Brent characterizes as his difficult personality. Conversely, Keith Devlin believes that Peirce's work was too far ahead of his time to be appreciated by the academic establishment of the day and that this played a large role in his inability to obtain a tenured position.  Peirce's personal life undoubtedly worked against his professional success. After his first wife, Harriet Melusina Fay ("Zina"), left him in 1875, Peirce, while still legally married, became involved with Juliette, whose last name, given variously as Froissy and Pourtalai, and nationality (she spoke French) remains uncertain. When his divorce from Zina became final in 1883, he married Juliette. That year, Newcomb pointed out to a Johns Hopkins trustee that Peirce, while a Hopkins employee, had lived and traveled with a woman to whom he was not married; the ensuing scandal led to his dismissal in January 1884. Over the years Peirce sought academic employment at various universities without success. He had no children by either marriage.

Answer this question "what is it's main area of study?"
output: His Studies in Logic by Members of the Johns Hopkins University (1883) contained works by himself

input: Actress Juliet Landau said that when she first received the script, it indicated that Drusilla's accent could be British or American. Landau felt Drusilla "should really be Cockney, especially with the whole Sid and Nancy analogy." Though she never considered portraying Drusilla with a Southern American accent, as James Marsters had considered for Spike, she notes that invited comparisons with Blanche DuBois would also have been interesting.  Drusilla's madness is exhibited in her often-strange dialogue, which is peppered with non sequiturs like "Spike, do you love my insides? All the parts you can't see?" Her behavior is girlish, accompanied by a dark, ironic twist. For instance, when she is happy, she will squeal and laugh like a young child, but she is happiest when committing torture, hunting humans, or witnessing mass destruction. She has a fondness for china dolls but keeps them blindfolded or gagged. She also loves flowers and cute animals, but is not sane enough to care for them; as she says, "Do you like daisies? I plant them but they always die. Everything I put in the ground withers and dies." She even goes so far as to own a Pekingese puppy. She speaks in a soft, mellow voice which contrasts with her dialogue. All of "white hats" (both Scoobies and Angel's Investigations) are doubtful about how to deal with her, originally an innocent victim. Mostly and obviously Angel.  Drusilla's costumes were initially intended to be a "cross between a Victorian period look and the Kate Moss heroin chic fashion look," says Landau.

Answer this question "What was her best qualities?"
output: She speaks in a soft, mellow voice

input: Frege's 1892 paper, "On Sense and Reference" ("Uber Sinn und Bedeutung"), introduced his influential distinction between sense ("Sinn") and reference ("Bedeutung", which has also been translated as "meaning", or "denotation"). While conventional accounts of meaning took expressions to have just one feature (reference), Frege introduced the view that expressions have two different aspects of significance: their sense and their reference.  Reference, (or, "Bedeutung") applied to proper names, where a given expression (say the expression "Tom") simply refers to the entity bearing the name (the person named Tom). Frege also held that propositions had a referential relationship with their truth-value (in other words, a statement "refers" to the truth-value it takes). By contrast, the sense (or "Sinn") associated with a complete sentence is the thought it expresses. The sense of an expression is said to be the "mode of presentation" of the item referred to, and there can be multiple modes of representation for the same referent.  The distinction can be illustrated thus: In their ordinary uses, the name "Charles Philip Arthur George Mountbatten-Windsor", which for logical purposes is an unanalyzable whole, and the functional expression "the Prince of Wales", which contains the significant parts "the prince of x" and "Wales", have the same reference, namely, the person best known as Prince Charles. But the sense of the word "Wales" is a part of the sense of the latter expression, but no part of the sense of the "full name" of Prince Charles.  These distinctions were disputed by Bertrand Russell, especially in his paper "On Denoting"; the controversy has continued into the present, fueled especially by Saul Kripke's famous lectures "Naming and Necessity".

Answer this question "did he have a theory regarding the two?"
output: